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I. INTRODUCTION
Nancy and Larry Garrett were married in Jacksonville, Florida on
November 23, 1974. On March 9, 1978, their daughter Amy Rebecca was
born in Jacksonville, and the parties lived continuously in Jacksonville from
the time they were married until June of 1986.1 The Garrett family subse-
quently moved to Arlington, Texas and resided there until the couple's
separation in July of 1991.2 Shortly thereafter, Nancy and Amy Garrett
returned to Jacksonville and have remained there ever since leaving Texas.
Larry Garrett also left Texas after the separation and took up residence in
Greenwood, Indiana in August of 1992.3
On November 17, 1993, Nancy Gale Garrett petitioned the Circuit
Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida, for
dissolution of marriage from her husband, Larry Allen Garrett.4 Her hus-
band, while residing out of state, was served in Indiana with the petition for
1. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996) (No. 85,384).
2. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Garreu (No. 85,384).
3. Id.
4. See Garrett v. Garrett, 652 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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dissolution of marriage.5 In her petition, Nancy Garrett alleged that Florida
jurisdiction was proper for various reasons.6  The husband responded by
filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction stating that section
48.193 of the Florida Statutes did not confer personal jurisdiction over him
in Florida.7 The trial court denied the husband's motion and ruled that
Florida did have personal jurisdiction in the matter due to the husband's
significant contacts with the state.8
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the decision of
the trial court, holding that the criteria of Florida's long arm statute had not
been met.9 Accordingly, the trial court could not have properly exercised
personal jurisdiction over Larry Garrett.10 The appellate court cited to three
cases of precedent" in determining that personal jurisdiction was lacking
over Mr. Garrett. In each of these cases, the gap in time between the
defendant's prior residence in Florida and the commencement of the action
was determined to be too remote, thus barring exercise of personal jurisdic-
5. Iti
6. Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991, 992-93 (Fla. 1996). Among her reasons were that:
1) she had been a resident for six months prior to the filing of the petition for dissolution of
marriage; 2) she married Larry Garrett in Florida in 1974 and lived in Florida until the couple
moved to Texas in 1986 with their Florida born daughter, Amy Rebecca Garrett; 3) her
husband was born in Florida and currently travels to Florida to visit the daughter and other
family members; and 4) her husband visits Florida to conduct business within the state. Id.
7. Id. at 993.
8. Id. Judge Hugh A. Carithers, Jr. based his denial of Mr. Garrett's motion on the dura-
tion of the parties' marriage in Florida before moving to Texas, Mr. Garrett's personal and
business trips to Florida, and the child support payments made by Mr. Garrett in Florida. Id.
at 993 n.l.
9. Garrett, 652 So. 2d at 378. The First District Court of Appeal construed section
48.193(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes to mean that the defendant's residency must proximately
precede the commencement of the action for dissolution of marriage. Id. at 379. This was a
rejection of the argument proffered by Nancy Garrett that proximity is not merely a temporal
determination, but must be determined by the totality of the circumstances. IU.
10. Id.
11. First, in Shammay v. Shammay, 491 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), the
court interpreted section 48.193 to mean that the defendant's residency in the state must
proximately precede the commencement of the action. Id. at 285. Second, in Soule v.
Rosacco-Soule, 386 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980), the court rejected the position
that merely because a defendant resided in Florida sometime prior to the commencement of
the action, personal jurisdiction could be invoked under section 48.193. Id. at 863. Third, in
Bofonchik v. Smith, 622 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), the court found that a
husband's residence in Florida from 1984 to 1986 was insufficient to support personal
jurisdiction under section 48.193 in an action for child support filed by the wife in Florida in
1989. d. at 1357.
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tion over the defendant. 12 On rehearing en banc,'3 the First District Court of
Appeal reaffirmed the reasoning in their original opinion, but certified a
question of great public importance to the Supreme Court of Florida.
14
The Supreme Court of Florida, answering a revised certified question,
15
stated that Mrs. Garrett could not obtain personal jurisdiction over her
husband and, as a result, affirmed the decision of the First District Court of
Appeal)5 Although recognizing the minimum contacts that a nonresident
might have with a state so as to allow a court to obtain personal jurisdiction
consistent with the Due Process Clause, 17 the court chose to rely on whether
Larry Garrett's conduct fell within one of the statutory grounds for jurisdic-
tion found in Florida's long arm statute.' 8 The court stated that the language
of section 48.193(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes does not allow a Florida court
to obtain personal jurisdiction over any parties to a dissolution proceeding
where the spouses once resided in Florida but "abandoned Florida as their
state of residence" for any length of time.' 9 In other words, Mrs. Garrett
could not simply return to Florida, file for dissolution of marriage, and
obtain personal jurisdiction over her husband once she abandoned the
protection of Florida's laws by taking up residence in another state. Finally,
the court stated that Mr. Garrett's frequent trips to Florida for business and
his voluntary payment of child support were not relevant facts when applied
to the issue of whether section 48.193(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes allows
12. See Bofonchik, 622 So. 2d at 1355; Shammay, 491 So. 2d at 284; Soule, 386 So. 2d at
862.
13. Garrett, 652 So. 2d at 381.
14. Id. The question, as originally certified, asked: "WHEN MAY A RESPONDENT'S
PRIOR RESIDENCE IN FLORIDA BE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE PERSONAL JURIS-
DICTION IN AN ACTION CONCERNING ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT, OR DIVISION
OF PROPERTY?" Id. at 381-82.
15. The Supreme Court of Florida reworded the question: 'WHEN A MARRIED COU-
PLE RESIDING IN FLORIDA MOVES TO ANOTHER STATE, MAY ONE SPOUSE,
AFTER SEPARATION, SUBSEQUENTLY RETURN TO FLORIDA AND OBTAIN
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE OTHER SPOUSE BASED ON THE 'PRIOR
RESIDENCE' SECTION OF FLORIDA'S LONG ARM STATUTE?" Garrett v. Garrett, 668
So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 1996).
16. Id. at 994.
17. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion states: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 994.
19. Id
1996]
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for a resident spouse to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
spouse in a dissolution of marriage action.
20
This comment will focus on the potential harmful ramifications this
decision will have on the law of personal jurisdiction with regard to a
dissolution of marriage action in Florida. Part II will discuss the modem
concept of minimum contacts between a defendant and the forum state, and it
will examine how specific long arm statutes can restrict the outside limits of
due process established through the minimum contacts analysis. Part I1 will
focus on the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Florida in deciding Garrett.
Part IV will criticize the decision in light of a minimum contacts approach
which would have allowed the trial court to obtain personal jurisdiction over
the nonresident husband. Furthermore, this part will discuss the impact of
the decision on dissolution of marriage cases involving families in transition
and the possible consequences suffered by a resident spouse denied the
opportunity to litigate in Florida. Part V will conclude that the Florida
Legislature should amend section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes to allow
Florida courts jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a dissolution of
marriage action who has minimum contacts with the state, such that the suit
does not offend the notions of substantial justice.
II. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
A. The Modem Development of Personal Jurisdiction
Over fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held, in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,1 that due process only requires that "in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he not be present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'" 22 Since International Shoe, there has been a line of
cases2 interpreting the minimum contacts a nonresident defendant must have
20. Id.
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (second emphasis
added).
23. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,
436 U.S. 84 (1978).
[Vol. 21:491
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with the forum state before a court can obtain personal jurisdiction consis-
tent with the Due Process Clause.24 These cases explored the outer bounda-
ries of personal jurisdiction under due process. Many states have narrowed
these outer boundaries for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant by enacting long arm statutes that limit a plaintiff's ability to hale
a defendant into court. For example, in Florida, a court cannot find personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless allowed by a grant of
statutory authorization pursuant to Florida's long arm statute?2 Florida's
long arm statute specifies in detail the acts or conduct which allow for the
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
From the beginning of our federal system, courts have had to grapple
with the problem of the authority of a state to assert jurisdiction over parties
and property in cases involving transactions not occurring entirely within the
boundaries of a single state. Regardless, in every case, the court must have
power over the parties to the lawsuit to render an enforceable judgment.
Due process is the principal limit on the scope of this power.26 By com-
mencing the action in a particular forum, the plaintiff consents to personal
jurisdiction. The defendant however, is brought into the litigation involun-
tarily, and the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant must
satisfy constitutional due process standards.27
Historically, presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court
established personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, thus satisfy-
ing constitutional due process standards. In Pennoyer v. Neff,28 the notion of
24. In this context, the Court has referred solely to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
25. Section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who per-
sonally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection
thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is natural person, his or her
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause
of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts:
e) With respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division of
property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an
independent action for support of dependents, maintaining a matrimonial domi-
cile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defen-
dant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether co-
habiting during that time or not.
FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(e) (1995).
26. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27. Id.
28. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
1996]
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personal jurisdiction of a state court over a defendant was limited to persons
served within the state, persons domiciled in the state, and persons consent-
ing to jurisdiction.29 In Pennoyer, the Court stated that "[t]he authority of
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in
which it is established. 30  Pennoyer established the nineteenth century
constitutional doctrine that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property served with process within the
territory of the forum court.3
More recently, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the proposi-
tion that service within the forum state subjects a nonresident defendant to
the personal jurisdiction of the court.32 In the plurality opinion of Burnham
v. Superior Court of California,33 the Court clearly followed the precedent
established in Pennoyer, holding that if a party is served properly with
process while present in the forum, a court has personal jurisdiction over that
party regardless of the existence or nonexistence of minimum contacts with
the forum. 34 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, stated that "[a]mong the
most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction ... is that the
courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically
present in the State. 35 Consequently, the Court rejected the notion that in
the absence of continuous and systematic contacts with the forum, a nonresi-
dent defendant can be subjected to judgment only as to matters that arise out
of or relate to his contacts with the forum.
36
29. IL at 714.
30. I1 at 720.
31. Id. at 722.
32. See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
33. IM
34. Id. at 618.
35. Id. at 610. In Burnham, the Court referred to matters that arise out of or relate to a
defendant's contacts with the forum. See generally Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S.
604 (1990). These terms are synonymous with "general" and "specific" jurisdiction. General
jurisdiction exists when the number and quality of a defendant's contacts with the forum state
are sufficiently substantial such that one may litigate any dispute in the courts of the forum,
whether or not that dispute grows out of those contacts. Arthur T. Von Mehren and Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136
(1966) [hereinafter Von Mehren and Trautman]. Specific jurisdiction exists when the contacts
with the forum are related to the dispute sought to be adjudicated. Id. More recently,
Professor Mary Twitchell proposed to replace the terms general and specific with "dispute-
blind" and "dispute-specific." See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HARv. L. REV. 610, 613 (1988) [hereinafter Twitchell].
36. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 616.
[Vol. 21:491
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The opinion also recognized the weakening of Pennoyer's rationale. 37
This weakening was due to changes in the technology of transportation and
communication and the tremendous growth of interstate business activity.
38
These changes led to a "'relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdic-
tion' ' '39 over nonresident individuals. Furthermore, the Court noted that
many state courts were focusing their attention on the minimum contacts
analysis and overlooking the simple fact that a defendant might have been
present in the forum, no matter how fleeting his presence. Nevertheless, in
Burnham, the Court held that obtaining personal jurisdiction by complying
with Pennoyer's requirement of presence within the forum satisfied the
constitutional requirements of due process. 40 The plurality concluded that
jurisdiction based on presence alone constitutes due process because
presence is one of the continuing traditions that defines the due process
standard of "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 4 '
Unlike physical presence, the minimum contacts analysis developed by
the Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington42 involves a balancing of
the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts in the forum state, his or
her connection with the cause of action, and the interests of the forum in
protecting citizens from nonresidents. 43 The development of the minimum
contacts analysis expanded the Nineteenth Century view of personal juris-
diction found in Pennoyer v. Neff. Under International Shoe, the amount of
contact with a forum state necessary to justify an exercise of jurisdiction
depends on the relationship between the defendant's contacts with the forum
and the plaintiff's cause of action.44
International Shoe eliminated the need to resort to a finding of consent
to jurisdiction or a finding of presence within the jurisdiction. Two new
criteria were set forth by the Court, such that personal jurisdiction would be
proper if the cause of action arose from the party's activities within the state,
or if the cause of action arose from conduct outside the forum state by a
party who engaged in continuous and systematic business within the state.
45
These two standards of International Shoe have evolved into the concepts of
37. Id. at 617.
38. 1
39. I. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J. dissenting)).
40. Id. at 618.
41. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619.
42. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
43. See id. at 319-20.
44. See id. at 320.
45. See id. at 319-21.
1996]
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specific and general jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction exists over an out of
state party when the cause of action arose out of that party's contacts with
the forum, regardless of whether those contacts occurred within the state.46
General jurisdiction exists over any cause of action if an out of state party
has engaged in continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state.47
The most important contribution to the personal jurisdiction analysis by the
Court in International Shoe was the determination that the Due Process
Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in
personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties, or relations. 4 8
The State of Washington claimed that International Shoe owed the state
unemployment compensation fund contributions. 49 The State of Washington
filed suit in a Washington court in an attempt to collect the unpaid funds.
The issue in the case became whether, within the limitations of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State of Washington
could assert personal jurisdiction over the International Shoe Company.50
The Court's widely quoted holding stated that due process required only
that a defendant "have certain minimum contacts [with the forum] such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."51 Using the facts of the case, the Court applied this
new standard of minimum contacts and found that the activities and conduct
of the International Shoe Company were "neither irregular nor casual. 5 2
The company's activities resulted in a large volume of business, in the
course of which the International Shoe Company received "the benefits and
protections of the laws of [Washington], including the right to resort to the
courts for enforcement of [the company's] rights. 53 The Court also held
that the company's conduct was "systematic and continuous throughout the
years in question. 54 Accordingly, the Court felt that the International Shoe
Company's operations established sufficient contacts with the State of
46. See Twitchell, supra note 35, at 613.
47. See Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 35, at 1136.
48. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
49. Id. at 311.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
52. Id. at 320.
53. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
54. Id.
[Vol. 21:491
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Washington to permit the state to enforce any obligations or debts which the
company incurred in Washington.55
Several cases since International Shoe have further defined the scope
and meaning of a defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state. In
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,56 the Court held that personal
jurisdiction was improper unless the defendant purposefully availed himself
of the privileges and protection of the forum's laws by conducting activities
within the forum state.5 7  The Court also stated that when a defendant
purposefully directs activities at the forum state, the defendant has notice of
the possibility of being haled into the forum's courts.5
Additionally, in Kulko v. Superior Court of California,59 the United
States Supreme Court found that a California court had no personal jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident father living in New York who paid child support to
his daughter living in California.60 The Court reasoned that the mere act of
sending his daughter to live in California and paying child support suggested
no intent by the father to purposefully avail himself of any benefits from the
55. Id. at 319-20.
56. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., Harry and Kay Robinson
purchased a new Audi car from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. in Massena, New York in 1976.
During their move to Arizona the following year, the Robinsons were struck in the rear by
another car while driving in Oklahoma. An alleged defect in their Audi left Mrs. Robinson
and her two children severely burned from a fire caused by the accident. Subsequently, the
Robinsons joined World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. as a defendant in the products liability
litigation. The Court held that this defendant had no ties, contacts, or relations with the State
of Oklahoma and that the lower court lacked personal jurisdiction over World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. Id. at 299.
57. Id. at 297 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
58. Id.
59. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
60. Id. at 96. Under a separation agreement executed by Sharon and Ezra Kulko in 1972,
their children were to remain in New York with the father during the school year and spend
vacations in California with the mother. Ezra Kulko agreed to pay $3,000 per year in child
support for the periods that the children were with Sharon in California. In 1976, Sharon,
now remarried, filed an action in Superior Court of California asking for permanent custody of
the children. The father appeared specially and moved to quash service of the summons,
claiming that he was not a California resident and lacked sufficient minimum contacts with
California as formulated in International Shoe. Id. at 88. The trial court denied his motion,
which he appealed to the California Court of Appeal. Id. The appeals court affirmed the trial
court ruling, reasoning that by allowing his children to live in California, and by paying child
support, he had caused an effect in the state warranting the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over him. Id. at 88-89. The Supreme Court of California granted review and affirmed the
rulings of the lower state courts. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 89. Thereafter, Ezra Kulko petitioned for
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 90.
1996]
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forum state.6' Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall stated that, "the
state courts in the instant case failed to heed our admonition that 'the
flexible standard of International Shoe' does not 'heral[d] the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.' 62
Also, in Hanson v. Denckla,63 the Court held that personal jurisdiction
was proper only if the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protection of that state's laws.64 The Court held that Florida had not satis-
fied this test in attempting to assert jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee in a
dispute over the validity of a trust that had been established by a Pennsylva-
nia domiciliary who subsequently moved to Florida.65  The majority's
conclusion that minimum contacts was not a mechanical application, but
rather a factual determination of the requisite "affiliating circumstances" of
the case, broadened the scope of obtaining personal jurisdiction under due
process.
66
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 67 however, Justice Brennan took
the minimum contacts analysis one step further by stating that even if
minimum contacts with the forum exist, other factors may be considered that
would prevent a court from obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.68  These factors led to a reformulation of the minimum contacts
analysis in that, depending on the presence or absence of these factors, more
or fewer contacts will suffice. Applying the reformulated approach to the
minimum contacts analysis, the Court held that personal jurisdiction existed
over Rudzewicz, a Michigan franchisee of Burger King, in a suit in Florida
based on a franchise agreement. 69 The Court emphasized that Rudzewicz's
ongoing contractual relationship with Burger King's corporate headquarters
in Miami was purposefully directed to the forum and gave Rudzewicz fair
61. Id. at 96.
62. IM. at 101 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
63. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
64. See id. at 235.
65. Id. at 254.
66. Id. at 246.
67. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
68. Id. at 476. These factors include: "'the burden on the defendant,' 'the forum State's
interest in adjudicating the dispute,' 'the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief,' 'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies,' and the 'shared interests of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies."' Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1990)).
69. ld1 at 487.
[Vol. 21:491500
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warning of being subject to suit in Florida.7° Justice Brennan also cited to
the fact that Florida had a legitimate interest in protecting a resident corpo-
ration from a breach of contract by a nonresident franchisee.7'
In the complex case of Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall,72 the Court held that Helicol's 73 contacts with the State of Texas were
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.74 In Helicopteros, all the parties conceded that the
claims against Helicol did not arise out of, and were not related to, Helicol's
activities with Texas. 75 Because of this concession, the Court explored the
nature of Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas to determine whether
those contacts were the kind of systematic and continuous business activities
that would allow the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.76 Using this approach, the majority concluded that Helicol's contacts
with Texas were insufficient to satisfy due process and reversed the judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of Texas which earlier held that Helicol was
subject to the jurisdiction of the Texas court system.77
In Justice Brennan's dissent, the suggestion was made that the majority
made no distinction between controversies that relate to a defendant's
contacts with a forum and those that arise out of such contacts.78 Justice
Brennan believed that the undisputed contacts between Helicol and the State
of Texas were sufficiently important and sufficiently related to the underly-
ing cause of action.79 Justice Brennan stated that Helicol had purposefully
70. Id. at 482.
71. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482-83.
72. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
73. Helicol is the common trade name of Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
74. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418-19. On January 26, 1976, a helicopter owned by
Helicol crashed in Peru. Four United States citizens were among those who lost their lives in
the accident. Helicol is a Colombian corporation with its principal place of business in the
city of Bogota, Colombia. The decedents of the crash were employed by a Peruvian consor-
tium headquartered in Houston, Texas. This consortium, through Helicol, purchased
helicopters, spare parts, and accessories for more than four million dollars from Bell Helicop-
ter Company in Fort Worth, Texas. Helicol also sent pilots to Fort Worth for training and
received into its New York City bank accounts over five million dollars in payment from the
consortium for the purchase of the helicopters. Despite these contacts, the majority opinion of
the Court was unwilling to analyze Helicopteros as a "specific" jurisdiction case based on
these specific contacts with the United States. Id.
75. Id. at 415.
76. Id. at415-16.
77. Id at418-19.
78. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
1996]
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availed itself of the benefits and obligations of Texas law, and that these
contacts would not "'offend [the] 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.'"80 In response to Justice Brennan's dissent, the major-
ity stated that the distinction between controversies that relate to a defen-
dant's contacts with a forum and those that arise out of such contacts was
never raised as an issue in the case.81 The majority cited to the fact that the
decedents' representatives made no argument that their cause of action either
arose out of or was related to Helicol' s contacts with the State of Texas.
82
In the most recent personal jurisdiction case, Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court of California,83 a divided Court revisited the issue of
personal jurisdiction based on a defendant's minimum contacts with the
forum state.84 Asahi, a Japanese corporation, manufactured a valve assembly
used by a Taiwanese corporate defendant in a motorcycle tire tube.85 The
Taiwanese corporation, Cheng Shin, impleaded Asahi in a personal injury
suit filed in California.86 Asahi was aware that the valves were used in
products sold in California, but knew of no other contacts with the State of
California.87
The opinion, written by Justice O'Connor and joined only by three
other Justices, concluded that merely injecting a product into the stream of
commerce, even knowing that the product might end up in the forum state, is
insufficient for a finding of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.88 This
portion of the plurality opinion further stated that absent more purposeful
conduct, such as advertising designed specifically for the market, or provid-
ing service facilities in the forum, the minimum contacts analysis could not
be met in this case.89
80. See id. at 420 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
81. Id. at 416.
82. Id.
83. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
84. lI at 105.
85. Id at 106.
86. Id. On September 23, 1978, in California, Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda
motorcycle and collided with a tractor. In September of the following year, Zurcher filed a
product liability action against Cheng Shin, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the bicycle tube.
Id. Cheng Shin impleaded Asahi Metal Indus. Co., the manufacturer of the tubes' valve
assembly. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
87. Id. at 107.
88. Id. at 112. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell and Scalia, concurred in this
portion of the opinion.
89. Id.
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In another part of Justice O'Connor's opinion, eight of the Justices
joined in holding that, regardless of the existence of minimum contacts, an
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi would "offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." '90 In Asahi, the Court explained
that the determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in
each case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. 91 A court must
consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination
"'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies."' 92 The Court considered these factors in Asahi
and held that, even apart from the question of the placement of goods in the
stream of commerce, it would be unreasonable to allow the assertion of
jurisdiction over Asahi.93 The Court concluded that the burden on the
defendant was unreasonable, particularly because Asahi was an international
defendant, and the only claim remaining before the California court was the
third party indemnification claim by Cheng Shin against Asahi.94
The decision in Asahi called for a court to consider the procedural and
substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the
95assertion of jurisdiction by a state court. In every case, those interests, as
well as the federal government's interest in foreign relations, will be better
served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of
jurisdiction in the particular case. 96 By viewing this case in an international
context, the Court managed to find that the heavy burden on Asahi, weighed
against the slight interest of the plaintiff, Gary Zurcher, and the forum state,
was too great to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California
court over an alien defendant.97 Thus, in similar cases, perhaps limited to
foreign parties, the reasonableness of jurisdiction must be examined even
though the party has minimum contacts with the forum state.
90. Id. at 113 (quoting International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
91. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
92. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
93. Id. at 116.
94. Id. at 114.
95. Id. at 115.
96. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
97. Id. at 116.
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B. Long Arm Statutes Narrow Minimum Contacts
Statutes conferring the power to exercise personal jurisdiction over
persons outside the state are called long arm statutes. To assert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a state court must satisfy the
requirements enumerated in the state's personal jurisdiction statute.98 Long
arm statutes allow personal jurisdiction whenever federal due process is
satisfied or they allow personal jurisdiction on narrower grounds, such as by
performing specific acts within the forum state. Even though due process
may be satisfied, personal jurisdiction may be improper if the state long arm
statute's requirements are not met.
A number of states, such as California,99 have enacted statutes that
permit courts in those states to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full
extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The proper analysis under this type of coextensive long arm statute is simply
to evaluate whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum.
Other states, such as Florida,1°° have long arm statutes that set forth particu-
lar circumstances that permit courts in those states to allow an exercise of
personal jurisdiction over persons outside the state. In these states, the outer
boundary of the statutorily conferred jurisdiction is the maximum extent of
jurisdiction that a court can assume.
I-l. GARRETr V. GARRE=T
In the First District Court of Appeal opinion of Garrett v. Garrett,'0' the
court addressed the issue of whether the trial court lawfully acquired
personal jurisdiction over Larry Garrett pursuant to Florida's long arm
statute.102  The trial court cited several factors that established sufficient
contacts with Florida which allowed the court to obtain personal jurisdiction
over Mr. Garrett. Among these factors were the duration of the marriage in
Florida before the parties moved to Texas, the husband's frequent trips to
Florida for business, the husband's voluntary payment of support in Florida,
and the wife's representation that the husband expressed a desire to return
98. See Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
99. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Deering 1991). This section states that: "A court of
this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
state or of the United States." Id.
100. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1995).
101. 652 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
102. Id.
[Vol. 21:491
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 13
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss1/13
McMahon
his residence to Florida.103 The appellate court disagreed with the trial
court's finding and stated that long arm jurisdiction may be exercised only if
the cause of action is based on conduct or omissions of the nonresident
defendant that arose out of his residency in Florida.1 4 The First District
Court of Appeal further stated that both parties voluntarily left Florida for
their new residence in Texas and left no real property in Florida. 05 Also, the
couple remained in Texas for five years prior to their separation. These
factors created an insufficient showing of residential proximity in Florida to
support a finding of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Florida's long arm
statute.106
Nancy Garrett argued that the determination of proximity is not merely
a temporal determination but must be examined in light of the totality of the
circumstances.' 7 Mrs. Garrett cited Durand v. Durand,10 8 a case in which
the Third District Court of Appeal found long arm jurisdiction over a
husband who had not resided in the state for over six years prior to the
commencement of the action.1' 9 In Durand, the court based its decision on
the totality of the circumstances, which encompassed several facts including
the wife and children's continued residence in Florida and the parties
ownership of real property in Florida.110 Furthermore, the court focused on
the fact that the marital home was in Florida and the separation of the
marriage occurred in Florida.' However, the First District Court of Appeal
ruled that, unlike the situation in Durand, Mr. Garrett's residency was too
far remote in time from the cause of action1 12 As a result, no Florida court
could have obtained personal jurisdiction over Mr. Garrett." 3
In dissent, Judge Benton stated that when personal service has been
accomplished, as was the case with Mr. Garrett, the only limitation on the
grant of personal jurisdiction was that the husband have sufficient minimum
103. Id
104. Id at 379.
105. Id.
106. Garrett, 652 So. 2d at 379.
107. Id.
108. 569 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 583 So. 2d 1034 (Fla.
1991).
109. 1d at 839.
110. Id
111. I
112. Garrett, 652 So. 2d at 379. Again, Mr. Garrett had not been a resident of Florida
since 1986.
113. Id
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contacts with Florida. 14 Moreover, Judge Benton believed that the totality
of the circumstances in the present case satisfied the minimum contacts
analysis required for due process." 15 Nevertheless, the First District Court of
Appeal rejected this position, stating that a defendant's residency in the state
must proximately precede the commencement of the action." 6 Alternatively,
the majority concluded that the totality of the circumstances insufficiently
supported a finding of personal jurisdiction over Larry Garrett, and it
vacated the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.' 17
When the Garrett case reached the Supreme Court of Florida," 8 the
court distinguished between the minimum contacts analysis and the strict
language codified in Florida's long arm statute in determining when a
nonresident defendant may be subject to the power of a state court. 19 The
court began the analysis by establishing that a state's power to exercise
personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 20  Next, the court acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court had decided many cases using the minimum contacts
approach in determining when a state court can exert personal jurisdiction
consistent with due process. 121 The court concluded that a state has the
power to enact statutes governing the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents as long as the statutes are either "coextensive with or more restrictive
than" the outside limits of due process established by the United States
Supreme Court. 122 Finally, the court pointed to the fact that Florida's long
arm statute 12 enumerates the specific situations in which jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant is proper.124
First, the court focused on the language of section 48.193(1)(e) of the
Florida Statutes, the specific part of the long arm statute dealing with
proceedings connected to a dissolution of marriage action. 15 The court
114. Id. at 380 (Benton, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 380-81.
116. Id. at 379.
117. Garrett, 652 So. 2d at 379.
118. Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996).
119. Id. at 993-94.
120. Id. at 993 (relying on Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102
(1987)).
121. Id.
122. ld.
123. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1995).
124. Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 994.
125. Id. at 993 (citing FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(e)).
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quoted a section of the statute that reads, "if the defendant resided in this
state preceding the commencement of the action,"'' 26 and it stated that this
portion of the statute cannot be taken "quite so literally."' 27 Turning to the
facts of the case, the court stated that when the Garretts left Florida in 1986
to set up residence in Texas, they effectively "abandoned" Florida.' 28 The
opinion went on to state that, "[t]o allow the court to obtain personal
jurisdiction under these circumstances would empower the Florida courts to
exercise jurisdiction over any party to a dissolution proceeding if the couple
had ever lived in this state, for however brief a time."
129
In defense of this position, the court cited two district court of appeal
cases which allowed personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(e) of the
Florida Statutes."30 In each of those cases, the matrimonial domicile had
been in Florida and one spouse continued to maintain residence in Florida
after the parties separated. By contrast, the Garretts lived in Texas as a
married couple for five years after leaving Florida and maintained no
residence or real property in Florida until Nancy Garrett returned to Florida
after the separation in 1992.131 Based on the dissimilarities between the
Garrett case and the two district court cases interpreting section
48.193(1)(e), the court stated that obtaining personal jurisdiction over Mr.
Garrett was not possible under Florida's long arm statute.
32
Nancy Garrett alternatively argued that the Florida courts could exer-
cise jurisdiction over her husband under a minimum contacts analysis. Mrs.
Garrett stated that her husband had sufficient contacts with Florida which
allowed her to file suit in Florida. 33 First, she alleged that her husband
periodically came to Florida to visit their daughter, Amy Rebecca, and also
to visit other family members living in Jacksonville. 34 Second, Mrs. Garrett
stated that her husband often traveled to Florida to conduct business in
preparation for his possible return to Florida.135 Finally, Mr. Garrett was
126. Id. at 994 (quoting FLA. STAT. §48.193(l)(e)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 994.
130. See Durand v. Durand, 569 So. 2d 838 (Fa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Binger v.
Binger, 555 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 560 So. 2d 232 (Fla.
1990).
131. Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 994.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 992-93.
134. Id. at 993.
135. Id.
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directly maling child support payments in Florida on behalf of Amy Re-
becca. 136 Despite these contacts with Florida, the court stated that a mini-
mum contacts analysis was not legally relevant to the issue of whether the
prior residence provision of section 48.193(1)(e) applied to a grant of
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Garrett in a dissolution of marriage action.' 37
The court concluded the opinion by holding that because the Garretts jointly
abandoned Florida as their state of residence, Mrs. Garrett lost the
"protection' of section 48.193(1)(e).' '138 Accordingly, the decision of the
First District Court of Appeal was affirmed.
139
IV. IMPACT OF GARRETr
A. Disregard for Minimum Contacts
If a person freely and expressly consents to the jurisdiction of a state,
there can be no question that the state may legitimately exercise authority
over him. However, if a person does not consent to the jurisdiction of a
state, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
without violating any procedural due process right' 4° by applying a minimum
contacts analysis to the facts of the case. Despite the approval of the
minimum contacts analysis by the United States Supreme Court, many state
legislatures have enacted long arm statutes that limit the situations in which
a state may obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The Florida
Legislature enacted section 48.193 which limits personal jurisdiction to the
acts enumerated in the statute. 41
As a result, a defendant's minimum contacts with Florida may not
become legally relevant in resolving the final determination of a court's
power over a nonresident spouse in a dissolution of marriage action. 42 This
was the problem that Nancy Garrett encountered when her case came before
the Supreme Court of Florida.143 Indeed, Larry Garrett had the requisite
minimum contacts with the State of Florida' 44 to allow a Florida court to
136. Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 993.
137. Id. at 994.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. For a discussion of procedural due process, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).
141. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193.
142. See generally Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 991.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 991.
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obtain personal jurisdiction over him pursuant to section 48.193(2). 145 By
narrowly focusing the Garrett decision on the language of section
48.193(1)(e), the Supreme Court of Florida failed to recognize that Larry
Garrett's activities within the state subjected him to the jurisdiction of the
court pursuant to section 48.193(2).
Section 48.193(2) of Florida's long arm statute is defined as a "general
jurisdiction" statute. When a defendant has systematic and continuous
contacts with the forum state, a court in that state may exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant regardless of the connection to the defendant's activities
within the forum.146 In Garrett, the husband periodically visited his daughter
in Florida, paid voluntary child support in Florida, and frequently visited
Florida on business trips. This type of continuous contact satisfies the due
process analysis articulated in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 47 and
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.148 This conduct also
falls within the language of Florida's restrictive long arm statute.
149
The court's decision in Garrett failed to look beyond the issue of Mr.
Garrett's residential proximity to the underlying cause of action. In fact, the
court should have analyzed Mr. Garrett's numerous contacts with the state
which were sufficient to support Mrs. Garrett's claim that the trial court had
proper jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding. The real issue in Garrett
was whether a nonresident had consented to personal jurisdiction in Florida
based on his purposeful availment of the protections and benefits of the
forum. This affiliation with Florida was free and knowing because, by
intentionally establishing a relationship with Florida, the defendant had
voluntarily submitted to the sovereign authority of the state.
Mr. Garrett was voluntarily paying child support to his daughter in
Florida. Furthermore, Mr. Garrett conducted business activities in Florida
during various trips throughout the year. Finally, his frequent visits to see
his family in Florida demonstrated his purposeful and continuous contacts
with the state. Due process only requires that a defendant have a reasonable
expectation that he may be haled into court in the forum state as a result of
145. Subsection (2) of section 48.193 states that: "A defendant who is engaged in sub-
stantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate,
intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not
the claim arises from that activity." FLA. STAT. § 48.193(2) (1995).
146. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
147. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
148. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
149. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193(2) (1995).
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his activities within the state.' 50 Again, Mr. Garrett purposefully availed
himself of the benefits of Florida's laws by freely conducting business and
personal visits within the state. After all, nonresidents cannot be denied
entry into a state,151 and nonresidents cannot be refused the opportunity to
engage in economic activity within a state. 52 Accordingly, Larry Garrett's
contacts with Florida were such that the Supreme Court of Florida could
have allowed for a grant of personal jurisdiction by the trial court under a
minimum contacts analysis.
In addition, none of the policy factors that weigh against a grant of
jurisdiction, despite a finding of minimum contacts with the forum, would
have denied the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Garrett. These
factors include the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state,
and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief.153 Moreover, a court must also
consider the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining efficient
resolution to controversies and the shared interest of the several states in
furthering social policies. 154 In World-Wide Volkswagen 155 and Asahi,156 the
Court explained that the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in
each case will depend on an evaluation of these factors. Finally, the Court
clearly stated that when minimum contacts have been established, the
interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will
justify "even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant."'157
Turning to the facts in Garrett, Mr. Garrett had voluntarily placed
himself within Florida's jurisdiction many times prior to the filing of the
dissolution of marriage action. The burden on Mr. Garrett to physically
appear in a Florida court was substantially lessened by his ongoing willing-
ness to visit Florida for various reasons. Also, Nancy Garrett submitted an
affidavit to the court alleging that Mr. Garrett desired to move back to
Florida and that he was continuously seeking suitable employment in
Florida. 58 In this case, the defendant's contacts were established, and the
defendant showed a desire to return to the forum state permanently. Thus,
the burden on the defendant was minimal, if not non-existent.
150. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
151. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
152. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
153. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
154. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
155. Id
156. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
157. Id.
158. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996) (No. 85,384).
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Second, Florida's strong public policy favoring parental responsibil-
itY1 59 was impaired by denying the trial court the authority to obtain personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident father who voluntarily paid child support in
Florida for the benefit of his daughter. The Supreme Court of Florida
ignored Florida's strong social policy' 6° of protecting a child's parental
support. Therefore, since the burden on the defendant was minimal and the
state's interest was great, the court erred by not affirming Mrs. Garrett's
claim of personal jurisdiction over her nonresident husband.
Mrs. Garrett had a compelling interest in her litigation with her hus-
band. First, her monthly salary of $1,283.75161 was grossly insufficient to
cover her living expenses. Unless Mrs. Garrett was granted the divorce in
Florida, her financial circumstances limited her ability to pursue her rights
out of state.162 Florida clearly has an interest in protecting dependent wives
and their children from impoverishment and possible dependency on state
services due to the inability to obtain relief in a dissolution of marriage
action.163 This compelling interest in the litigation was never thoroughly
considered by the court anywhere in the Garrett decision.
Second, a denial of personal jurisdiction over her husband would
unduly impede Mrs. Garrett's ability to seek the financial settlement neces-
sary to alleviate her financial shortfall. Again, if a spouse is unable to
159. See Morris v. Morris, 672 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). In Morris, the
first district, following the supreme court decision in Garrett, rejected a grant of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident husband in a dissolution of marriage action. Specially
concurring, Justice Booth stated:
The facts of the instant case appear to be more egregious than those in Garrett in
that Appellee's minor child, who was born in this state and resided here for ten
of his twelve years, suffers from Down's Syndrome. The child is now effectively
deprived of parental support, contrary to this state's strong public policy favoring
parental responsibility and jurisdiction of courts based on the presence of the
child.
Id. at 624 (Booth, J., specially concurring). Justice Booth criticized the decision in Garrett
which held that, "'[b]ecause the Garretts jointly abandoned Florida as their state of residence,
the wife lost the 'protection' of section 48.193(1)(e)."' Id. Justice Booth stated, "There is no
mention in Garrett of the child's right to the protection of the statute, and this was, I believe, a
major oversight. A minor child's right to parental support is not readily subject to waiver or
abandonment." Id.
160. See id. at 622.
161. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996) (No.
85,384).
162. ld.
163. Telephone Interview with Nancy N. Nowlis, Attorney at Law (Aug. 7, 1996)
(Nowlis was the attorney for Nancy Garrett in the case at issue in this case comment).
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establish alimony or equitable distribution rights in a dissolution of marriage
action, then the ability to obtain effective relief is diminished, resulting in a
devastating effect on dependent children. Despite this sincere need by Mrs.
Garrett to obtain relief, the Supreme Court of Florida disregarded these
factors in the analysis of whether personal jurisdiction over her husband in
Florida was proper.
B. The Cost of Ongoing Litigation
Mrs. Garrett's first attempt to litigate this matter occurred in Texas
where she filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.164 Shortly thereafter,
she dismissed her petition in Texas and moved to Florida. Then, in 1994,
Mrs. Garrett filed a second petition for dissolution of marriage in the Circuit
Court for Duval County, Florida. After the trial court found that Florida did
have personal jurisdiction over her husband, Mr. Garrett filed an appeal with
the First District Court of Appeal.65
This appeal added further cost to Mrs. Garrett's strained financial
budget. As a result of the appellate decision in Garrett, Mrs. Garrett was
forced to appeal her case to the Supreme Court of Florida.166 After the final
decision by the Supreme Court of Florida, Mrs. Garrett was left with the
costly prospect of filing a third dissolution of marriage action in her hus-
band's state of residence, Indiana. Certainly, the interstate judicial system
would not be harmed by allowing a spouse the opportunity to litigate in
Florida with a nonresident spouse who clearly meets the minimum contacts
analysis developed by the United States Supreme Court and meets the
statutory criteria of Florida's long arm statue. In fact, the efficient resolution
of the case in Florida would have put an end to the litigation and prevent the
potentially costly litigation in the Indiana court system.
V. CONCLUSION
There is confusion "in respect to Florida courts having personal
jurisdiction and Florida courts obtaining personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant by service of process pursuant to the 'long arm stat-
ute."' 67 Even the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the
difficulty of defining when a forum state can exercise personal jurisdiction
164. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996) (No. 85,384).
165. See Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 993.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 994 (Wells, J., concurring).
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over a nonresident defendant.168 Furthermore, long arm statutes that enu-
merate the contacts which subject a defendant to jurisdiction within a state
may prevent a plaintiff from obtaining judicial relief over a nonresident
defendant whose minimum contacts with the state do not meet the long arm
statute's narrow list of acceptable contacts. One solution is to use a purpose-
ful affiliation analysis for all personal jurisdiction cases in the State of
Florida. 169 This solution focuses attention on the extent to which the person
has freely and knowingly associated himself with the state in a way that
subjects him to the sovereign power of that state.170 However, this solution
fails to take into account other factors such as the defendant's burden to
litigate in a foreign state, the plaintiff's interest in the litigation, and the
state's interest in protecting its own citizens.
In Florida, the better solution is to clearly enact a statute that allows a
plaintiff spouse in a dissolution of marriage action to obtain personal
jurisdiction over a defendant spouse when the defendant spouse has mini-
mum contacts with Florida such that the "maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'""7' By using
the minimum contacts analysis developed by the United States Supreme
Court, Florida's courts can go beyond the restrictive language of the long
arm statute and consider other factors relevant to the determination of
personal jurisdiction. These factors include "'the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies;"' and the interest of the plaintiff in seeking adequate relief.
172
The Florida Legislature must amend section 48.193(1)(e) to allow for the use
of a minimum contacts approach in replacement of the current language
which states in part, "if the defendant resided in this state preceding the
168. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,
436 U.S. 84 (1978); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
169. For a good discussion on adopting a purposeful affiliation test nationwide, see Roger
H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
849, 890 (1989).
170. Id.
171. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
172. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
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commencement of the action.' 173 The current language is ambiguously
written, causing confusion as to the residential proximity a defendant must
have in Florida prior to the commencement of the action. The minimum
contacts approach alleviates this confusion and allows the court to properly
focus on the conduct of the defendant within the state, thus permitting the
court to examine other factors relevant to the maintenance of the suit and
due process.
Gregory P. McMahon
173. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(e) (1995).
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